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THE EFFECTS OF SUCCESS RELATED PRESSURE
ON INFORMATION PROCESSING STRATEGIES AND PLAN CONTINUATION ERROR
Bourgeon Léonore, Valot Claude, Fauconnet Sophie, Loyau Fanny
French military institute of biomedical research
Brétigny-sur-Orge, France
Navarro Claude
Laboratory of work and cognition – University of Toulouse
Toulouse, France
An experiment was conducted to explore whether plan continuation errors could be explained by
two types of perseveration behaviours: Perseveration in a wrong Representation do the Situation
(PRS) and Perseveration in a risky Plan of Action (PPA). Effects of success-related pressure and
flight phase on pilots performance were also examined. Six scenarios were created where
expected or unexpected threats had to be managed. Pilots chose between three plans of actions
corresponding to PPA, PRS and Flexibility. Results showed that the two types of perseveration
could effectively explain plan continuation errors even though PPA characterised cruise phase
and PRS was more frequently chosen when managing threats during the approach phase. An
effect of success-related pressure was observed as pilots experiencing high pressure were more
flexible than pilots experiencing low pressure.
Plan continuation error or bias is an essential component of numerous aeronautical accidents. It occurs
when pilots fail to revise an original flight plan despite emerging evidence that suggests it is no longer safe and
that a new plan is required (Orasanu, Martin & Davison, 2001). An analysis of accidents reports revealed that
nearly two-thirds of decision errors can be classified as plan continuation errors (NTSB, 1994). Moreover, a
European safety study showed that between 1991 and 1996, 41.5% of fatal accidents in general aviation were
due to perseveration on landing under degraded meteorological conditions while they only represent 4.5% of all
accidents (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 1997). This inability to adapt to changes in the environment which
leads to human error can also be related to a general behaviour called perseveration and defined in psychology
as “the difficulty experienced in switching from one pattern of behaviour or method of working to another”
(Coleman, 2001), as opposed to flexibility. This being so, perseveration may be observed in a large number of
accidents such as a meteorologically changing context or the management of technical failures and may occur at
any moment in the flight plan. For example, in military aviation, some accidents occurred when pilots
persevered in applying check-lists whose items did obviously not match with the current situation. It is then
essential to identify the underlying cognitive processes and factors that impair this decision making process.
Models of aeronautical decision making describe three main processes which are: information
perception, elaboration of a mental representation of the situation and selection of a plan of action. Plan
continuation error may result from any of these three processes. When an important cue relative to a threat is not
perceived or is not interpreted as a threat, the pilot representation of the situation is inaccurate, leading to an
inadequate plan of action (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). When it is perceived and
properly interpreted as a threat, a plan continuation error may still occur if pilots underestimate the risk level
associated with the continuation of their action plan and/or they overestimate their capacity to control the
situation (Orasanu, Fisher & Davison, 2002; Goh and Wiegmann, 2001). Hence, plan continuation error could
be explained by two types of perseveration behaviour: 1) Perseveration in a wrong Representation of the
Situation (PRS) and 2) Perseveration in a risky Plan of Action (PPA). Moreover, many reports of accidents
happening during the landing phase revealed that pilots made continuation plan errors even though they were
aware early on of the deterioration of weather conditions at the destination field. Hence, plan continuation error
can occur while changing flight conditions are expected and anticipated. This behaviour may be explained by
the PPA type of perseveration where relevant information is perceived and well interpreted but where pilots fail
to assess the risk level related to their plan of action. Yet, most studies dealing with plan continuation errors in
flight simulation do not manipulate the threat expectancy factor and only refer to unexpected threats. One goal
of our study was to verify whether these two types of perseveration could be observed in plan continuation
errors and especially by comparing flight situations with expected vs. unexpected threats.
Additionally, while most studies on aeronautical decision making were conducted with commercial
aircrews, fewer have been realized with military aircrews (Denihan, 2007; Sicard, Taillemite, Jouve & Blin,
2003). Yet, in this particular domain, flight situations can result in a high degree of complexity due to specific
and sometimes hazardous missions (Prince & Salas, 1993). Flying the aircraft may become a secondary task
compared to the mission related task (Sicard et al., 2003). In this context, organizational pressure may be very
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high and expressed in the form of pressure to succeed with the mission. A study by Denihan (2007) revealed
that naval aviators acted in ways designed to foster their combat mission success over safety. Indeed, interviews
of 11 pilots showed that cues related to reducing risk level and considered in the decision making process during
non-combat missions were not considered during combat missions. Hence, organizational pressure may increase
conflict between mission-related goals and safety-related goals. Yet, in a commercial flight simulation
experiment using think-aloud protocols, external pressures represented only 4.2 percent of pilots talk (Orasanu,
Fisher & Davison, 2002). Analysis of military pilot decision making could be of interest in determining how
organizational pressure can have an impact on plan continuation error. The context of flight in the face of a
threat is also an important component of plan continuation errors. An analysis of accident reports showed that
plan continuation error is more frequent during approach and landing than during other phases of flight
(Orasanu, Martin & Davison, 2001). Still, results from a study conducted in a simulation session where pilots
encountered adverse weather did not support this finding (Wiegmann, Goh & O’Hare, 2002). On the contrary,
unlike pilots who encountered adverse weather late during the flight, the majority of pilots who faced this event
early during the flight decided to continue in accordance with their original flight plan. This result was
explained by the authors as the need and the possibility for pilots to verify their assessment of the situation. In
our study, we examined the impact of flight phase using various types of threats, such as deteriorating weather
conditions, technical failure and external threat.
The purpose of this study was to verify three main hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that plan
continuation errors would be explained by two types of perseveration behaviours: Perseveration in a wrong
Representation of the Situation (PRS) and Perseveration in a risky Plan of Actions (PPA). On one hand, we
expected that PRS would be characterised by wrong diagnosis and PPA by accurate diagnosis. On another hand,
we expected that when threats are expected by pilots, plan continuation error should be explained by PPA while
when threats are unexpected, plan continuation error should be explained by PRS. Second, we expected that a
high organizational pressure would lead to plan continuation error while low organisational pressure would lead
to flexibility. Finally, we expected that flight phase would impact decision making processes where the
approach phase should lead to more plan continuation error than take-off and cruise phases.
Methods
Participants
Twenty pilots (19 men, 1 woman) from the French Air Force squadron specializing in the
transportation of government authorities participated in the study. In flight hours, the participants’ total flight
experience ranged from 800 to 7,000 hrs and their mean total flying experience was 3442 hrs (SD = 1433 hrs).
They ranged in age from 28 to 38 years with a mean age of 33 years (SD = 3 years). Participation in the study
was on a voluntary basis with complete anonymity of the personnel.
Procedure
Participants were first asked to fill out a biographical questionnaire including information regarding
their age and their flight experience. They were then given the experiment instructions and started the training
session. When they felt comfortable with the use of the interface, they could start the experimental session. The
latter was composed of three screens: 1) description of a flight situation (current coordinates of the flight) with
contextual information (nature of the mission, flight plan, meteorological conditions, fuel level). Pilots were
asked to build a mental representation of the situation and to click on the next stage only when they felt ready.
They were informed that from this moment a stopwatch was started; 2) graphic interface representing the
cockpit panel. Pilots could click on any instrument or messages they needed to be able to make a decision
between three choices of action. Next, they had to complete a confidence level scale from 1 (no confidence in
the decision made) to 5 (extremely confident in the decision made); 3) finally, they were asked to write down
what elements influenced their decisions and what were the goal(s) they wanted to reach.
Graphic interface
The experiment was conducted with a laptop using the software “E-Prime”. This software enables
recording of all the actions made by the participants. Hence, analysis of decision making processes was possible
with the creation of a specific graphic interface showing the front panel of a A319 cockpit (figure 1). Pilots
clicked on a particular instrument to bring up a small information window displaying the information usually
provided by this instrument. Additional links were displayed on the side of the panel providing information
from Co-pilot, Air Traffic Controller and Cabin Crew. Pilots could open only one window at a time. Participants
practiced on a training session until they felt comfortable with the set-up.
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Figure 1. Graphic interface used in the experiment representing an A319 panel. All shaded rectangles could be
clicked by participants.
Flight scenarios
Six scenarios were created for the study in collaboration with two pilots who were experts in human
factors. They were designed in such a way that each flight situation was ambiguous and where the decision
could only be made by the judgment of the pilot with no need for a check-list. Moreover, the threats illustrated
by our scenarios had all been involved in incidents or accident databases. The six scenarios reflected three
variables employed in this experiment. Threat Expectation (expected threat vs. unexpected threat) and Flight
Phase (take-off, cruise, approach) were within-subject variables. Success-Related Pressure (high success-related
pressure vs. low success-related pressure) was a between-subjects variable. For the expected threat condition,
three of the scenarios were conceived such that a potential threat was presented in the first description of the
flight situation whereas in the three unexpected threat scenarios no potential threat was initially presented.
Additionally, each of these conditions occurred during either the take-off, cruise or approach phases of flight.
Each participant responded to the six scenarios in random order. Organizational pressure was studied through
success-related pressure which was manipulated by the nature of the mission presented at the beginning of the
flight situation description. Pilots in the high success-related pressure condition had to convey important
government authorities whereas pilots in the low success-related pressure condition had to convey neutral
passengers. Flight plans were the same under both conditions.
Measurement of performance
Three plans of action were presented to participants as a decision choice. They could either divert the
flight judging the situation to be much too risky, or they could continue according to the initial flight plan while
monitoring flight parameters because of a high risk level, or finally they could continue according to the initial
flight plan judging there was no associated risk. These 3 choices corresponded to the perseveration
categorizations: Flexibility, PPA and PRS. For ANOVA analyses purpose, these responses were encoded into a
numerical variable respectively as 3, 2 and 1, from the most appropriate decision to the least appropriate one.
Information processing was analysed through 3 indicators: amount of information accessed, amount of target
information accessed related directly to the threat and time spent reading target information as an indicator of
the importance of the information for decision making. Finally, participants had to write down all cues that
played a role in their decision choice and what goals they wanted to reach. These data were analysed with an a
posteriori grid coding for building cue categorization and assessing accuracy of the diagnosis.
Results
Decision performance
In order to verify if plan continuation error could be explained by two types of perseveration, we
analysed the distribution of the nature of the decision made by participants. Results showed that plan
continuation errors were committed on 64 of 120 or 53% of decisions and flexible decisions were taken on 56 of
120 or 47% of decisions. On the 64 plan continuation errors, 48 were PPA or 75% and 16 were PRS or 25%,
p(χ2) < .05. When examining the distribution of the two types of perseveration as a function of Threat
Expectancy, results showed that when threats are expected 27 plan continuation errors on of 31 or 87% were
explained by PPA and 4 of 31 or 13% were explained by PRS. When threats were unexpected by pilots, 21 of 33
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or 64% of plan continuation errors were explained by PPA and 12 of 33 or 36% of plan continuation errors were
explained by PRS, p(χ2) < .05. The distribution between flight phases also showed a significant difference
between take-off and cruise phases (p(χ2) = .05) and between cruise and approach phases (p(χ2) < .05). Indeed,
when threats were managed during the cruise phase, none of the plan continuation errors was explained by a
PRS, whereas during the take-off phase 3 of 16 or 19% were explained by PRS and during approach phase 13 of
38 or 34% were explained by PRS.
Effects of Success-Related Pressure, Threat Expectation, Flight Phase and their interactions on decision
performance were then analyzed with ANOVAs. Performance was significantly influenced by Threat
Expectation (F(1, 18) = 4.69, p < .05) and by Flight Phase (F(2, 36) = 55.7, p < .001) but not significantly
influenced by Success-Related Pressure (F(1, 18) = 2.53, p > .10). On one hand, performance was better when
threats were expected than when they were unexpected and on the other hand, performance was better during
take-off and cruise phases than during approach. The effect of Success-Related Pressure was observed in
interaction with Threat Expectation (F(1, 18) = 9.12, p < .05): when threats were expected, success-related
pressure had no significant impact on performance (F(1, 18) = 0.72, p > .10) whereas when threats were
unexpected pilots under high success-related pressure performed better that pilots under low success-related
pressure (F(1, 18) = 11.27, p < .05). Interaction between Success-Related Pressure and Flight Phase was not
significant nor was interaction between Threat Expectation and Flight Phase.
Information processing
ANOVAs were conducted for the three independent variables on the amount of information accessed,
the amount of target information accessed and the time spent on reading target information. A significant effect
of Flight Phase was found on the amount of information accessed (F(2, 36) = 5.6, p < .05) where the later
threats happened during flight, less information was accessed: around 16 data (±1.5) were accessed during takeoff phase, around 12 data (±1.4) were accessed during the cruise phase and around 10 data (±1.3) were accessed
during the approach phase. No significant effects were found for Success-Related Pressure, Threat Expectation
nor for their interactions. ANOVAs conducted on the amount of target information accessed revealed no
significant effect for any of the three variables nor for their interactions. The results of the analyses of time spent
reading target information showed only one significant effect of the interaction between Threat Expectation and
Flight Phase (F(2, 36) = 6.35, p < .05). During take-off and approach phases, time spent reading target
information was not significantly different as a function of threat expectancy whereas during the cruise phase,
pilots spent more time reading target information when threats were unexpected than when they were expected.
Relations between indicators of information processing and the nature of the decisions were analysed using
Spearman correlations. No significant effect was found for any information processing indicators since all
correlations were close to 0.
Decision cues, diagnosis accuracy and goals to achieve
In order to identify which information was taken into account for decision making, pilots had to give a
written account, explaining how they made their decisions and what goals they wanted to achieve. All texts were
then classified into: decision making cues, accuracy of diagnosis and goals. Of the 120 decisions made during
this experiment, target information was mentioned in 60 decisions (50%), while target information was not
mentioned in the 60 others (50%). Distribution among pilots experiencing high success-related pressure and
those experiencing low success-related pressure showed that 67% of pilots with high success-related pressure
mentioned target information whereas only 33% of pilots with low Success-related pressure mentioned it, p(χ2)
< .001. The link between the number of decisions where target information was mentioned with the nature of the
decision taken showed that 71% of flexible decisions were explained with target information whereas only 33%
of decisions leading to plan continuation errors were explained with target information, p(χ2) < .001. On the
other hand, no significant difference was found between PPA and PRS, where 37% of PPA decisions were
explained with target information for 19% of PRS decisions.
The distribution of diagnosis accuracy with nature of decisions showed a significant difference: 78% of
flexible decisions were associated with an accurate diagnosis and for 22% of them no diagnosis was expressed
while only 45% of decisions leading to plan continuation errors were associated with accurate diagnosis and
22% of them were associated with a wrong diagnosis, p(χ2) < .001. Furthermore, 50% of PPA decisions were
associated with accurate diagnoses and 17% with wrong diagnoses while only 19% of PRS decisions were
associated with accurate diagnoses and 50% of them were associated with wrong diagnoses, p(χ2) < .05.
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Goals to be achieved that were mentioned by participants could be classified into 4 categories: 80%
were about maintaining the safety level of the aircraft, 13% were about ensuring that passengers could arrive at
their destination, 4% were about maintaining the safety level of passengers and/or aircrew, and 3% were about
ensuring effective organization of aircraft repair. The distribution among pilots with a high success-related
pressure and low success-related pressure revealed a significant difference (p(χ2)=.05): 90% of goals mentioned
by pilots with low success-related pressure were about aircraft safety levels and 5% concerned the assurance
that passengers could arrive at destination while they represented respectively 71 % and 20% for pilots with a
high success-related pressure.
Discussion
Our first hypothesis was that plan continuation error could be explained by two types of perseveration
behaviour: PRS which describes plan continuation error as committed from a wrong representation of the
situation and PPA which describes plan continuation error as committed from an accurate representation of the
situation but with a risky choice of action. This hypothesis was verified since both types of perseveration were
chosen by participants as the right plan of actions to make when faced with flight threats. Moreover, the link
with diagnosis accuracy confirmed that a majority of PPA decisions were characterised by accurate diagnosis
while a majority of PRS were characterised by wrong diagnosis. Yet, no difference in the amount of target
information mentioned as decision cues was found between PPA and PRS. This may be explained by the fact
that several participants did not mention any decision cues at all, even though it is probable that they did take
into account some information when making their decision. Additionally, PPA decisions were chosen more
frequently to counter flight threats than PRS. Plan continuation errors would then seem to be more frequently
due to a difficulty with anticipating the risk associated with a plan of action than a difficulty with assessing the
current situation. Yet, our results showed that as a function of threat expectancy, the two types of perseveration
are distributed differently. A more important part of plan continuation errors are explained by PRS when threats
are unexpected than when threats are expected. This confirms our categorisation of plan continuation errors,
since PRS characterizes a wrong representation of the situation and when threats are unexpected it takes more
cognitive resources to build an accurate representation of the situation than when threats are expected. Hence,
the difficulty encountered by pilots when threats are expected is more about choosing a safe plan of action
whereas when threats are unexpected the difficulty is more about finding cognitive resources in order to build a
correct representation of the situation.
Our second hypothesis was not verified since pilots with high success-related pressure chose more
flexible decisions than plan continuation decisions and inversely for pilots with low success-related pressure.
The effect on performance was significant when the threats to be managed were unexpected. Hence, when
threats are anticipated pilots may have enough cognitive resources to anticipate flexible solutions whatever the
type of pressure. On the contrary, when threats are unexpected pressure has an impact on the decision made by
pilots. The presence of important authorities on board seemed to push pilots to privilege safety over mission
success. This result is at the opposite of those found by Denihan (2007) where naval pilots on combat mission
would rather foster mission success over safety. A bias in the experiment may explain this difference: because
pilots had important passengers on board, they could have been tempted to show that this had no influence on
their decision. Indeed, results showed that pilots with a low success-related pressure wanted to achieve more
safety-related goals than pilots with high success-related pressure who were more concerned about ensuring that
their passengers could arrive at destination. Yet, pilots with high success-related pressure mentioned more
frequently target information directly linked to threats to be managed than pilots with low success-related
pressure, which confirms that pilots with high success-related pressure may have built a better representation of
the situation which could explain their better decision performance.
Finally, our results confirmed our third hypothesis that the context of the flight, illustrated here by
flight phase also has an impact on plan continuation errors. As expected, performance was better during take-off
and cruise phases than when threats happened during the approach phase. In this phase, PRS was most chosen
while during the cruise phase plan continuation errors were only explained by PPA. This result suggests that
when pilots commit plan continuation errors during approach it could be more due to a difficulty in building an
accurate representation of the situation than to a deliberate choice of actions. Indeed, our results showed that the
frequency of PRS is in accordance with flight phase workload. The heavy workload of the approach phase could
hinder pilots in building an accurate representation of the situation leading to a PRS type of plan continuation
error. This result is also supported by the fact that it was during the approach phase that pilots accessed the least
amount of information. This result meets those found by Muthard and Wickens (2003) who showed the effect of
workload on plan continuation errors in the context of the use of automation.
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In conclusion, this study confirmed that plan continuation errors can be explained by two types of
perseveration behaviours: Perseveration on a wrong Representation of the Situation (PRS) and Perseveration on
a risky Plan of Actions (PPA). This distinction is important to make, since recommendations concerning how to
recover from them will focus on different aspects such as specific training in simulator for improving
information processing or providing techniques to help pilots to better estimate risks associated with a plan of
actions. Finally, success-related pressure illustrated here by the presence on board of important passengers
seems to improve decision performance. Yet, further research is needed to complete theses findings and
eliminate possible bias.
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